

NSC BRIEFING

30 September 1959

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IRAQ

- I. Events during past two weeks have increased chance of internal explosion.
  - A. Execution of Brigadier Tabaqchali, former commander of Second Div, and twelve other army officers has caused strong reaction in army officer corps and among anti-Communist nationalists.
  - B. Rumors that Qasim intends to order execution of Col. Arif--former pro-UAR deputy prime minister--and other long-imprisoned nationalists have helped bring Qasim's relations with nationalist elements to new low.
  - C. Intensive UAR propaganda attacks portraying Tabaqchali as great nationalist martyr and prophesying early end Qasim regime "at hands of Iraqi people" are hitting home.
  - D. Govt security forces have kept nationalist demonstrations under control, but wilder demonstrators have shouted "down with Qasim" and torn down his pictures.
  - E. Qasim reacted violently last Saturday in speech attacking "pro-imperialist" plotters. Qasim declared that outside elements were trying to upset the "stable" situation in Iraq.

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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
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ANNEX

PROBABLE ISRAELI, TURKISH, BRITISH AND JORDANIAN  
REACTIONS IN EVENT UAR TROOPS MOVED INTO IRAQ

- I. Israel would see such UAR action as move to eliminate key disruptive element to pan-Arab nationalism and establish a unified belt of Arab States which would threaten Israel's existence. Possibility of Israeli attack on UAR would be serious and immediate.
- II. Turkey, long fearful that a nationalist coup would put UAR in saddle in Iraq still regards Qasim as best hope for stability there though  thinks Iraq govt will turn Communist in near future and present Turkey with greater threat than UAR takeover. 25X1
  - A. Any Turkish action would depend on way in which situation developed and on attitude of US.
- III. UK govt thinks Qasim's chances of continuing in power are decreasing. British probably would not seriously contemplate any military intervention.
  - A. Rather British would try to use their remaining political and economic ties with Iraq to limit extent of Nasir's influence over new govt there.
- IV. Although King Husayn of Jordan still feels he has legitimate claim to rulership of Iraq, Jordan unlikely to be major factor in this situation.



B. Husayn, although still highly distrustful of Nasir, might consider some joint action with UAR but Nasir wants no Jordanian participation in his plans

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